This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.
Introduction
On the occasion of the United States presidential election in 2004, former president Bill Clinton, who was not running as candidate, stated: "Generally, the presidential elections in the United States turn always around three questions.
First: how one would feel at having that person as president?… As second element there is the candidate's position on certain issues. The third factor is the following: What is this election about? Is it about the United States having a multilateral attitude in foreign policy? Or is it whether taxes should be lowered for the rich or more should be done for the poor?"
In this paper we focus on the third factor: what elections are about. Just to mention an illustration of the relevance of the selection of issues during the electoral campaign, let us also quote somebody involved in the November 4 th , Barak Obama pointed out that "Senator McCain's own campaign said publicly last week that, if we keep on talking about the economic crisis, we lose, so we need to change the subject."
This paper discusses the criteria for party choices of issues and the subsequent campaign outcomes. We present a formal model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of the public agenda, in which political parties or candidates compete to win an election by choosing an issue and a policy position on that issue to which they try to give political salience. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal on the issue as an alternative to the status-quo policy, as well as talking about it, usually with a value or argument, and making it news with some effort investment in order to making it relevant for voters' electoral decisions.
A party will choose a priority issue to campaign for if it is a likely winning issue, that is, it has a likely winning position and it is likely to become decisive in the election.
Whether an issue will become a winning issue depends on two variables: (i) the ex-ante 'pre-campaign or social salience' of the issue in voters' concerns and (ii) the voters' support or 'consensus' in favor of an alternative policy proposal on the issue.
Thus, parties have to trade off the two variables. If one issue is highly salient in the voters' concerns, but voters are highly divided about which one of the possible policy alternatives to the status-quo is better, choosing to campaign on the issue by holding one of the policy alternatives may be risky. If, on the contrary, there is broad social consensus about the best policy alternative to the status-quo on one issue, but the issue is not a priority for voters' electoral decision, running on that issue can attract little attention.
Hence, whether parties compete by raising the same issue and proposing two different policy alternatives on it or by choosing different issues does not depend only on voters' priority concerns, but also on each party's likelihood to hold potentially winning policy positions. It is always possible that the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of voters be not given political salience by parties during the electoral campaign. As a consequence, mediocre policies broadly rejected by the electorate, as well as incumbent parties with no good performance in government, may survive.
Foundational works about the importance of agenda-setting in competitive elections include the well-known contributions by Stokes (1963) and Petrocik (1996) .
They depart in important aspects from the standard 'spatial theory' of electoral competition, in which parties or candidates compete by choosing policy 'positions' on a space which is basically given. (See the critical review of the literature by Colomer and Puglisi (2005) . However, not a formal model had been elaborated, to our knowledge, which specifies the structural and strategic conditions in which political parties or candidates choose issues in the electoral campaign and shape the relevant policy space.
We discuss these conditions and analyze the type of issues --as defined for their salience in voters' concerns and the acceptation of policy proposals on them-which should be expected to be chosen in equilibrium.
To give some realistic support to this discussion, let us consider a couple of examples. When, after World War II, the British labour party in government introduced a general system of social security, including universal health care, unemployment benefits, pensions for the elderly and other safety nets, this was a very innovative policy. It quickly won the support of wide layers of the society, thus inducing the conservatives to adapt to that policy. Policy consensus on the issue existed for several decades, in Britain as in many other countries following similar experiences. But the labour or the social-democratic parties were, generally, more broadly trusted by the public interested in the issue than the conservative ones and, thus, they tended to emphasize this issue in their electoral manifestos and campaigns.
In another instance, the policy of balanced budgets, that is, to equate the public revenues with expenditure over the business cycle, was very innovative when it began to be introduced in the United States in the 1980s. Later on, in light of its effects for reducing inflation, the policy of near-balanced budgets was adopted by the European Riker (1993) , Budge (1993) , Budge et al. (2001) , Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen (2002) , Klingemann et al. (2006) .)
The plan for the rest of the paper is the following. In section 2 we present a spatial model of agenda formation in which parties compete on one issue at a time. For each issue there is some probability of victory for the party holding the most popular policy alternative. We introduce the concepts of issue salience and the degree of consensus. Section 3 presents equilibrium results. Section 4 provides several examples
showing that parties can compete on issues with either high salience or broad consensus or both. They do not compete, in equilibrium, on issues with both low salience among voters and low consensus regarding the best policy alternative. However, parties may choose not to campaign on those issues with highest salience in voters' concerns, thus postponing solutions to unpopular status-quo policies with considerable social discontent. In section 5, as an illustration, we discuss the choice of campaign issues for the 2004 United States presidential election in the light of the findings in the model. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider an incumbent party in government (G) and a challenger party in opposition 
The probability of winning on an issue
The winning alternative on a particular issue i is the one receiving a majority of votes.
There is uncertainty on the outcome of the election so that no alternative wins with probability one. π > π , that is i x is the advantaged alternative on 4 For the present analysis we only require that the previous conditions on induced preferences hold when all other issues are fixed at the status-quo. Hence, convexity of preferences is a stronger assumption than needed. 5 None of the qualitative results hinges on this assumption that we make to simplify the exposition.
issue i. Without loss of generality, we can sort the issues i = 1, …, N according to the probability of victory of the advantaged alternative. We assume for simplicity a strict ordering:
In order to shape the conditions of the electoral competition, we assume that a party cannot win by proposing an alternative already claimed by the other party. This implies that a party proposing a policy alternative on one issue forces the other party to defend something different if it wants to compete on that same issue. This assumption is consistent with the sequential play analyzed in this paper. 
Issue salience and policy consensus
Each issue is characterized by some social or pre-campaign salience, which reflects voters' concerns, and by some consensus on the best policy.
The preferences of voters regarding which issues should be more important in the election can be formed through personal experiences, media emphases, interest groups' promotions or uncontrolled events. But it seems logical that the degree of salience in voters' perception should be related to the degree of social discontent with the status-quo policy on the issue. In this sense, we measure the salience of issue i in an inverse relation to the agreement or consensus with the status-quo policy. High-salience implies that a large group of voters ( F F 
Therefore, the maximum value of consensus i ζ is 1, when there is total consensus on the best alternative to the status-quo (i.e. There are, however, several segments within this area which must be identified.
First, the triangle ABE captures all those issues which take relatively low salience among voters' as pre-campaign concerns ( 1/ 2 i σ < ) thus implying relatively high support for the status-quo policies on the issues (1
relatively high consensus on a policy alternative among the few discontented voters.
Given the low salience of these issues it is unlikely than any of them will be chosen in priority by any of the parties in the electoral campaign.
Second, the area BDE includes all those issues with relatively high salience ( 1/2 i σ > ), but relatively low consensus on an alternative policy to the status-quo. The area is defined by the line
which expresses that the probability to defeat the status-quo is exactly 1/2. On the left of this line,
, so that, for any policy alternative to the status-quo, the probability of victory is less than 1/2.
Finally, the larger area in the upper-right corner BCD encompasses all those issues which take relatively high salience ( 1/ 2 i σ > ) and on which a policy alternative to the status-quo obtains relatively broad consensus (
). This area corresponds to the set of likely successful issues. 
Post-campaign or political salience
In order to make an issue decisive in the election, parties try to make it 'salient' in voters' decision by giving it political salience. Parties confer political salience by campaigning on the issue and proposing a policy alternative to the status-quo. Let us call the political salience or post-campaign salience of issue k the probability that k becomes the decisive issue once parties have campaigned on issues i and j. We impose the following assumptions on the measure of political salience. First, parties can give political salience to an issue only by proposing a policy alternative to the status-quo. This implies that issues not raised in the electoral campaign do not get salience and hence cannot be decisive. Secondly, if both parties decide to campaign on the same issue, then it becomes the decisive issue since it is the only issue raised during the electoral campaign. Finally, if parties give political salience to two different issues, the probability for each issue to become decisive equals its relative salience.
Assumption 2. Given a pair of issues, , i j , chosen by the government and the opposition parties:
It follows that for any pair of different issues, ( ) 1 ( ) ij ij s i s j = − . We will write ( ) ij ij s s i = whenever there is no ambiguity.
The expected probability of electoral victory
Parties want to win the election. Observe that parties face uncertainty on the identity of the decisive issue as well as on the winning position on each issue. When parties compete on the same issue, this issue becomes decisive and their probability of victory coincides with their probability of holding the winning policy position on that issue.
When parties campaign on different issues, the probability of victory is the expected probability of holding the winning policy position on the decisive issue.
Definition 5. Define the expected probability of victory Π for a party proposing alternative a i on issue i, while the other party proposes alternative j a′ on issue j as
Observe that the definition presumes that voters associate the position of a party not proposing a policy alternative on an issue to the status quo.
Timing and equilibrium
The political game consists of choosing policy issues and alternatives to compete on for The final nodes represent the issues raised during the electoral campaign and the expected probabilities of victory for the incumbent government (G).
Equilibrium results
We focus the analysis on subgame perfect equilibria, the standard concept in sequential The strategies must be optimal responses in each subgame. Because this is a finite, zerosum game, a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and parties will have the same probabilities of victory in all equilibria.
We follow standard backward induction. We start by finding the optimal actions of the players at each final decision node and continue working back to the beginning of the game. q BR x ∈ if and only if 1 max
Subgames
x BR x ∈ if and only if 1
Proof: See Appendix. ## An implication of Proposition 3 is that the best response is independent of the pre-campaign salience i σ , and thus of the degree of social discontent with the status-quo policy, whether the best response is defending the status quo or raising a new issue. This result will also hold in the full game, as discussed below.
Corollary 1. Consider the policy proposal
Proof: See Appendix. ##
The full game
Consider the full game where the incumbent party may either take the initiative and propose a policy alternative on some issue (and hence play the subgame nw Γ ), or hold to the current situation and wait for the challenger to propose some alternative (and play subgame w Γ ).
As the following theorem shows, the equilibrium depends only on the two issues with the highest probabilities of victory. Whether parties compete on the same issue or raise different issues is independent of the pre-campaign issue salience, which reflects voters' concerns.
Theorem 1.
Consider an agenda-setting political competition game. π > π > − π ), the two parties raise different issues.
Equilibrium results can be presented in terms of issue salience and policy consensus.
Theorem 2. Consider an agenda-setting electoral competition game in which parties choose issues to be raised during the electoral campaign; i σ is the degree of issue salience and i ζ is the degree of consensus on a policy alternative to the status quo on issues i.
1. Let 1 1/ 2 σ < , then both parties focus on the same issue.
The degree of issue salience is low (all the issues are within the triangle ABE in the Figure 1). The government defends the status-quo on all issues and the opposition chooses the best issue to challenge the status-quo. They may not choose the most salient issue.
2. Let 1 1/ 2 σ > , but
, then both parties focus on the same issue. Figure 1, These results show that the incumbent government can benefit from a higher probability of winning and always chooses an issue with relatively high salience and broad consensus (within the set BCD in Figure 1 ), if there is any. By Proposition 4 the government will not choose issue 3 because the degree of policy consensus is low:
Some issue takes high salience among voters, but there is no broad consensus on the best policy alternative to the status quo on the issue (all the issues are within the set ABD in

Corollary 2. Let max min ( , )
. In fact, the incumbent government will take the initiative and choose issue 1, which is more salient and has broader consensus than issue 2. However, for the opposition to choose an issue, it is relevant to see that on issue 2 there is broader policy consensus than on issue 3, but issue 2 is much less salient. In this case, the trade-off is favorable to issue 3, in spite of having low consensus. At equilibrium, the opposition does not choose issue 2, which has both high salience and broad consensus, 2 1/ 2 σ > and 2 2 2 1 0.82
Proposition 5 does not apply to the opposition party.
Proposition 5 also shows that the only situation in which we can guarantee that 7 For all the examples we take the most salient issue is brought up during the electoral campaign is when there is high consensus on the best alternative in this issue and all the other issue show very low salience.
Examples
We provide a few numerical examples to illustrate how parties competing in setting the electoral agenda can overlook the concerns of the electorate, as represented by issue salience, by choosing either to defend an unpopular status-quo on the issue or not talking about it at all.
Neither the most salient nor the most consensual issues are chosen
Consider an election with four potential issues whose distribution of support among the electorate is represented by In equilibrium, government and opposition focus on different issues, 2 and 3 respectively. Specifically, the government takes the initiative and announces 2 x and the opposition responds by choosing 3 x . Both parties overlook issue 4, which is the most salient issue (90% of the electorate are against the status-quo), and issue 1, which is the one with highest consensus (everybody in favor of changing the status-quo agrees on the alternative policy). Nevertheless, they focus on issues with either higher consensus than issue 4 or more salience than issue 1. The government chooses issue 1, the only one in BCD (recall Proposition 4). The opposition does not choose issues 2 or 3 for lack of consensus on the best policy on those issues, but it rather challenges the government on the same issue 1. The electoral campaign focuses on the least salient issue. If the issue chosen by the government, 1, benefited from significantly broader policy consensus and were, thus, a more secure issue, the opposition would choose another issue (issue 2 in the example).
In this case, the opposition does not challenge the highly unsatisfactory statusquo policies on issues 2 and 3 (with around 80% of electorate in favor of changing the status-quo) as they lack voters' consensus on the best alternative. These are just specific examples to show possible occurrences. To approach more general results, we can note that parties will never choose the issue with both the lowest salience and the highest controversy or lowest consensus on the appropriate policy alternative. But regarding highly salient issues, if there is not sufficiently broad consensus on a policy alternative, the opposition party may choose not to challenge a highly unsatisfactory status-quo policy and the incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy performance. Other empirical analyses confirm the basic traits just remarked. According to Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde (2005) , vote decisions were based largely upon retrospective evaluation of Bush as a successful president and as a leader who would be successful in combating terrorism, while moral values and social issues had low importance. In a close analysis, it is noted that as the threat of terrorism remained a substantial concern through election day and afforded Bush an overwhelming advantage, although the state of the economy and the war in Iraq were viewed negatively by most voters (Abramson, Aldrich, Rickershauser and Rohde 2007) . In another stance by Campbell (2005) , it is remarked that the influence of the campaign was affected by major concerns that Kerry would not handle the war on terrorism as well as Bush, while there were more divided views about the economy and Iraq.
Illustration
We can observe that none of the candidates chose to campaign in priority for the issue which could have higher pre-campaign salience among voters, 'moral values'.
Numerous observers noted that, in spite of pundits' comments, 'moral values' ranked low in the issues list predicting actual voters' choices at the end of the electoral campaign (for instance, Langer and Cohen 2005) . Republican candidate George W.
Bush, instead of choosing this issue, on which he obtained relatively high consensus and advantage regarding the other candidate, chose the one in which his policy had the highest consensus, even if it was considered less important by the voters, 'terrorism'.
Democrat candidate John Kerry did not choose in priority the issue 'Iraq', which, as mentioned, would have been a direct response to the initiative in favor of 'terrorism' taken by Bush, apparently for lack of consensus on the best alternative policy. He instead chose the issue in which he could obtain the highest consensus, 'economy/jobs'.
Both candidates gave, thus, priority to those issues in which they could expect more favorable consensus among the voters and higher advantage regarding the other candidate, rather than those which were more salient in voters' concerns.
Conclusion
We have presented an agenda-setting model of electoral competition in which parties choose to give salience and campaign on those issues on which they expect their policy proposals will obtain voters' broad support.
Parties have to trade off the pre-campaign salience of each issue in voters' concerns and the voters' support or consensus in favor of the policy alternatives on the issue. We have found that, although parties will not compete on irrelevant issues (those with both low salience among voters and divisive policy proposals), indeed the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience during the electoral campaign.
This may be a surprising result, as remarked at the beginning of this paper, but it may be a reasonable one after all. Even if there is extensive public concern on some issue, if there is not a single policy proposal on the issue which can attract broad consensus, focusing on that issue might produce high division and polarization among both parties and voters. Important issues in people's concerns can, thus, be solved through electoral competition only when a policy alternative appears as clearly superior to voters' eyes. In the absence of a likely successful policy alternative, parties can choose not to give salience to the issue, thus maintaining the status-quo policy even if it is unsatisfactory for voters.
In the short term, mediocre policies broadly rejected by the electorate, as well as incumbent parties with no good performance in government, may survive for lack of a sufficiently convincing alternative. Since parties tend to choose to campaign on issues on the basis of relatively consensual policies, in the long term broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing number of issues. But since parties do not always choose to campaign on the issues with the highest pre-electoral salience, the political agenda may successively select, address and settle policy issues in an order which may not correspond to their importance in voters' concerns.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 
##
Proof of Proposition 2
, where we have substituted 1 2 F 
##
Proof of Proposition 3
1. We know that ( )
That is, if and
Since (0,1) ki s ∈ , the inequality holds if and only if 1
which is equivalent to the condition in the statement: 1 max π ≥ − π . The second condition implies that for all π > π > π for all 2 i > . Observe that ( , ) ( 1 ) 
Π Γ represents the incumbent government's expected probability of victory associated to any Nash Equilibrium of the subgame Γ s . Therefore, at the equilibrium path of the full game the opposition chooses x 1 while the incumbent government defends the status-quo in all issues.
Consider the following example with issues 1 1 ( , ) (0.3, 0.1) F F 
Proof of Corollary 2
We know that
